A Response to Dr. Robert Gonzales Jr.
For the sake of space I am publishing this response to an earlier thread as a separate post. For those who are interested in the entire debate, please read this post and it subsequent comments. I am here responding to Dr. Robert Gonzales Jr., dean of the Reformed Baptist Seminary. Here is a link to his original post, to which I am responding.
Dean Gonzales,
I can assure you that you have in no way bored me, but rather I have both enjoyed and learned from our exchange and your insight. My only regret is that I would have responded more quickly. Yet this was unavoidable considering my desire to devote adequate time to reading and reflecting on your comments.
Your most recent contribution has done a great deal to help me understand your position. Our subject (I will reiterate for other readers new to this topic) has been largely centered on the topic of religious epistemology and of general epistemology in light of the Christian religion. I have been articulating an evidentialist position and will continue to do so below. You, on the other hand, have given a very well-presented defense of the presuppositional view.
I should say before continuing that I have great respect for the presuppositionalist position. This is especially true since a number of my undergraduate professors articulated this view. However I have come to disagree with this perspective for several reasons.
First, I take issue with the notion that, as you say, “one must begin with some preconceptions of ‘reality.’” Where might these preconceptions come from? I am fairly certain that infants do not have a nuanced perspective of what defines reality as they go about learning the features of the world. Yet they do seem to possess the rudimentary skills for forming a valid perspective of reality. (I recognize that an infant cannot understand the full scope of reality, however my criticism still holds because the infant does seem to correctly understand and interact with the real world on a regular basis without the epistemic edifice of Christian presuppositions. Of course the infant is not infallible, but again, I think the criticism holds.) In my estimation, this mental apparatus for sensing the features of the external world is perfectly adequate for the task. Here, I am committing myself to a number of things which are basic to this perspective. I take it as fact that there is in fact an external reality. Furthermore I would say that the human sensory apparatus is trustworthy within reasonable limits. Of course, there are those who would dispute this perspective, namely those who hold to any form of idealism in the philosophical sense. However, I do not find these positions convincing and I think that that it is fairly commonsensical to deny them.
Additionally, I think that the presuppositionalist takes a rather dim view of the ability of mankind to obtain knowledge about God through the use of reason and observation directed at God’s natural revelation. I understand that this is a very controversial theological claim and furthermore that many conservative theologians would take issue here, claiming that the noetic effects of original sin prevent the overall success of this enterprise. Yet I will, with some admitted hesitance, say that I think that God does endow humanity with the ability to grasp certain aspects of his character through natural means. I think this is what the Apostle Paul means in Romans 1:18-20. Also, I think that in some sense you agree with me on this point because you stated “As a creature created as the imago dei, I have the ‘pre-programming’ necessary to interpret God’s world analogically to God’s own interpretation.”
Conversion is also a major problem for the presuppositionalist. What I mean by this is that, on presuppositionalism, it is impossible for a person to arrive at the conclusion that Christianity is true based upon rational argumentation. The non-believer cannot but think within the epistemic limitations of his assumptions and thus will not acquiesce to the Christian viewpoint unless supernaturally influenced to do so. I think that this is a problematic claim. Rather than supernaturally impressing some piece of revelation upon the mind of the convert, it seems that many times the Holy Spirit guides an individual through a rational argument the conclusion of which is the truth of the Christian thesis. I don’t deny that there are many presuppositions which, for instance, a naturalist might bring to the table which are difficult to overcome. However I do not think that it is impossible for someone to escape a naturalistic viewpoint except by the supernatural work of God.
Finally, I think that my initial criticism still holds with regard to the epistemic circularity of the presuppositionalist account. Ultimately, if we are to say that we view the world from a certain perspective we must arrive at the perspective by way of the sensory and mental apparatus common to all men. We cannot understand the Scripture without these basic abilities and therefore out understanding of God’s revelation is dependant upon our rationality at this level at least.
Let me also respond to a number of specific points you raised in your previous post.
As to the definition of reality, I don’t know for sure what you mean by an “athiest’s” or “Mother Theresa’s view of reality”. What I think you are saying is simply that different worldviews contain different notions of what the world is like. This does not mean that there is not some way of assessing the validity of these notions based upon reason, experience, or some other criterion which does not need to appeal to authority for its initial epistemic grounding. (Coincidentally, I have just been listening to a talk by the theologian Alister McGrath who has recently released a book in which he argues that the way we should go about assessing this kind of thing is to compare how the world looks when viewed through differing ‘lenses’. The correct perspective would have a kind of ‘resonance’ with the world. Amazon Link)
You stated that “if ‘falsehood’ is just as much part of ‘reality’ as ‘truth’ then one might justify such concepts as ‘true falsehoods’ or ‘false truths.’” I am not sure I understand this claim. I think what you mean by ‘true falsehoods’ would actually take the form “it is true that proposition X is false.” This does not seem to me problematic, but I welcome correction where necessary.
I was a bit confused by the two sentences as follows: “In other words, God has interpreted the world for me. As a creature created as the imago dei, I have the ‘pre-programming’ necessary to interpret God’s world analogically to God’s own interpretation.” These seem to be contradictory in that, in the first sentence, God does the interpretation and in the second God grants mankind the ability to do the interpretive act. Which do you mean?
Also, you pointed out a possible infinite regress regarding my analogy of the president of the United States. You said “If God must provide a reliable witness to confirm his identity, then would we not have to ask the same from his witness?” But I do not think this is a problem. God has attested to himself through Jesus Christ and has grounded the claim by acting in certain ways, namely miracles which indicate that he is who is says he is. Therefore, Jesus’ (often veiled, but nonetheless present) claims to divinity are grounded in his miraculous actions, and not his claim to divinity itself. (Some might say that I am here giving way to the presuppositionalist’s view in that I am assuming that miracles are possible. While I don’t disagree that believing that miracles are possible is a very Christian way of thinking, I do disagree with those who might say that it is exclusively Christian. I would argue that there is historical evidence for miraculous events and furthermore that there is nothing logically problematic with the notion that miracles do occur.)
As a footnote, I am indebted to this article by John Frame for some of my understanding of the presuppositional position. Also, my brother suggested a chapter by Alvin Plantinga in a recent edited work which applies to this topic. I plan on reading this chapter and perhaps writing a reaction here.
Dean Gonzales, I hope this explains my position a bit more. I really appreciate you taking the time to interact with me. I have learned quite a bit about the subject and have honed my thinking as a result.
Saturday, 21 June 2008 at 3:43 pm
I have greatly enjoyed reading this invigorating discussion. Both parties show a great deal of detail and care in forming their positions. I do want to point out what I feel is a flaw in the evidentialist position, one that I have already shared with my brother, the owner of this blog.
The flaw, I believe, lies at the foundation of the argument my brother made. His argument against presupposed notions of reality turn against itself. He says, “I take it as fact that there is in fact an external reality. Furthermore I would say that the human sensory apparatus is trustworthy within reasonable limits.” These two items are presuppositions to the evidentialist view and must be reached at one of two ways. Either you are granted them a priori from some external and objective pou sto or you make them a posteriori based upon the evidence for them. The former might accurately describe the position that Dr. Gonzales holds while the latter quickly becomes a circularity. This circularity is formed when one tries to justify the evidence held for the assumptions (namely that “there is an external reality… [and] that the human sensory apparatus is trustworthy within reasonable limits”). By saying this I mean that you can have evidence and argumentation in favor of these positions. Stepping back, however, you have to rely on the very ideas you are arguing for in order to provide warrant for your evidence.
It may be a safer place to start from to claim that as a part of what it means to be made in the imago dei is an ability to presuppose the two propositions in question (again that “there is an external reality… [and] that the human sensory apparatus is trustworthy within reasonable limits”). Upon this base all further evidence must rest.
This comment was written hastily and therefore may be unclear. I would be more than willing to clarify my argument if need be. I also welcome any rejoinder to my argument.
Tuesday, 1 July 2008 at 3:23 pm
The evidentialist position does not insist upon the evidential grounding of every proposition. Rather, the evidentialist seeks to locate the foundation of religious epistemology on grounds that are neutral and common to all mankind. You might call these a priori or perhaps basic, but I find this terminology somewhat cumbersome as each term carries with it some baggage. Rather, I would simply say that these foundational propositions are at some level self-evident although arguably so.
Saturday, 12 July 2008 at 11:27 pm
Nathanael,
I apologize for not responding to your post earlier. I’ve just been incredibly busy. I’m sure you can identify with that. ☺ Nevertheless, I have a little free time now and will attempt to provide a brief response to some of the objections you raised in respect to my epistemic framework.
First, you are correct to identify me as holding a basically presuppositional view of epistemology, though, like John Frame, I would hold a modified form.
Second, you take issue with the notion that one must begin with preconceptions of “reality.” Yet, as the first responder to your post points out, you seem to do that very thing. You “take it as a fact that there is in fact an external reality. Furthermore [you] say that the human sensory apparatus is trustworthy within reasonable limits.” You view these “presuppositions” as “foundational propositions” that are “at some level self-evident although arguable so.” I’m not sure what the added concessive clause means. Does “although arguably so” mean that you can provide proper warrant for such “foundational” and “self-evident” propositions? If so, you don’t seem to think such argumentation is necessary since, in your words, “the evidentialist position does not insist upon the evidential grounding of every proposition.” This allows you to hold a basic framework of interpreting the world without providing any epistemic justification. That seems like a convenient way to avoid the very circularity of which you accuse me.
Third, you “think the presuppositionalist takes a rather dim view of the ability of mankind to obtain knowledge about God through the use of reason and observation directed at God’s natural revelation.” You believe Romans 1:18-20 suggests otherwise. In response, I would point out that the presuppositionalist does in fact believe that all humans have been created with the noetic apparatus to perceive God through natural and special revelation. Indeed, according to Romans 1:18-21, all men do at some level “know” God. Moreover, the unbeliever knows what God requires of him (Rom. 1:32; 2:12-14). Yet, as Paul makes clear, the unbeliever “suppresses” the truth about God (v. 18). In another place he writes, “But the natural man does not welcome what comes from God’s Spirit, because it is foolishness to him; he is not able to know it since it is evaluated spiritually” (1 Cor. 2:14, CSB). Of course, the latter text is referring to special revelation, but I think the point is the same. Apart from a supernatural work of God’s grace the unregenerate man cannot obtain an epistemologically sound and ethically approved knowledge of God. In the words of Jesus, “No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him” (John 6:44).
Fourth, the problem of “conversion” you attribute to the presuppositionalist position is, I think, an unfair characterization. A presuppositionalist believes that men in general have the ontological equipment to know God properly. What is more, the presuppositionalist believes that the process of conversion includes the exercise of one’s mental and emotive faculties. Nevertheless, the presuppositionalist takes seriously Paul’s evaluation of the non-believer when he writes, “For the sinful nature is always hostile to God. It never did obey God’s laws, and it never will. That’s why those who are still under the control of their sinful nature can never please God” (Rom. 8:7-8, NLT). In other words, the natural man’s ethical aversion to God and his law prevents him from arriving at a true knowledge of God (John 17:3). He is like a bird with a broken wing. Ontologically, he can fly—he was created to fly. But ethically, he cannot fly. Consequently, God must, in the language of the prophet Ezekiel, replace the heart of stone with a heart of flesh” (Ezek. 36). Once this “heart-change” or reorientation of the ethical proclivities of the human heart has obtained, the individual will savingly embrace what he already knew deep down (at some level) to be true. You seem to believe that one may escape a “naturalistic viewpoint” apart from a “supernatural work of God.” That may be so. But in such a case, escaping a naturalistic viewpoint would not be equivalent to becoming a Christian. For according to Jesus, one cannot become a true believer apart from a supernatural work of God (John 3:3, 5; 6:37, 44).
Fifth, by referring to different “realities” (e.g., an atheist’s, Mother Teresa’s, etc.), I was simply making the point that not everyone shares the same “foundational propositions” (to use your language) from which to assess truth claims or to interpret empirical data. The atheist does not see belief in God as properly basic. The Christian—at least the presuppositionalist—does. You seem to think all men begin life at ground zero epistemologically and ethically. Presumably, they then begin to build a “reality” based on an unbiased sensory accumulation and mental interpretation of brute facts. I would differ. There are passages in Scripture that portray humankind as born sinners (Psa. 51:5; 58:3; Eph. 2:1-3). I agree that general and special revelation does, at some level, “resonate” within the heart of every man. But he does not, apart from God’s saving grace, properly respond to that revelation. In the words of Cornelius Van Til, “The most depraved of men cannot wholly escape the voice of God. Their greatest wickedness is meaningless except upon the assumption that they have sinned against the authority of God …. The natural man accuses or else excuses himself only because his own utterly depraved consciousness continues to point back to the original natural state of affairs. The prodigal son can never forget the father’s voice. It is the albatross forever about his neck” (“Nature and Scripture,” The Infallible Word, 2nd edition [Presbyterian & Reformed, 1967], 274-75).
Sixth, by “pre-programming,” I did not mean to say that everyone is born with a complete (let alone correct) knowledge of God.Rather, to use an analogy, humans have been created with a pre-formatted hard drive, so to speak. That pre-formatted drive is configured to receive and process divine revelation in a certain way. Because the natural man is born with an aversion toward God, he attempts to process divine revelation in a way that is inconsistent and incompatible with his “hard drive.” Hence, he cannot quite make sense of life. To use another analogy, processing the raw stuff of God’s universe into a reality like that of an atheist, an agnostic, a Buddhist, etc., is like trying to squeeze all the wrong feet into Cinderella’s slipper. They just don’t fit. But the self-authenticating gospel presented in Scripture (i.e., Cinderella’s foot) does fit. It alone truly resonates within the human heart as true.
Seventh, you don’t believe you’re faced with the problem of infinite regress or epistemic circularity as an evidentialist. Jesus’ claims to be Messiah and Savior of the world are grounded in his actions and miracles. But are the actions and miracles of Christ recorded in Scripture self-interpreting? For example, the Jesus foretold his resurrection and, according to the Scripture writers, many witnesses confirmed it. But what is the significance of such an event? How does a resurrection or walking on the water or healing a blind person ipso facto authenticate his claims to be the Son of God? Isn’t that the interpretation placed upon these events by Christ and his followers? Upon what epistemic or ethical grounds are we bound to accept their interpretation of the facts? I don’t think the evidentialist has a good answer to these questions. The presuppositionalist, on the other hand, argues that we must believe Christ’s claims and believe that his miracles validate his claims on the basis of divine revelation. What epistemic and ethical authority could be higher than God?
Finally, I prefer to view properly basic or presuppositional commitments as an epistemic spiral rather than an epistemic circle. Hence, I engage the evidence. With a bias? Yes. Actually, a hierarchy of biases. The most foundational are those most resistant to modification. The less foundational are, of course, more susceptible to modification and change. Nevertheless, my epistemic spiral doesn’t preclude the evidence from adjusting or modifying my biases. Admittedly, it would take quite a lot of evidence to dissuade me from my belief in the God of the Bible. Indeed, I don’t believe I could make sense out of the world apart from the Christian worldview as revealed in Scripture. In my view, is the pou sto upon which all being, knowledge, and ethics are predicated.
Well, I suppose I should get to bed. It’s been a pleasure interacting with you. May the Lord guide you into all truth!
Sincerely yours,
Bob Gonzales
Sunday, 13 July 2008 at 8:09 am
P.S. I know it was unintentional, but you misspelled my name in the title of the post.
Monday, 14 July 2008 at 11:27 am
Nathanael,
I have posted my reply above (slightly modified) to your response on my blog as “A Rejoinder to Nathanael Smith.” http://rbseminary.wordpress.com/2008/07/14/a-rejoinder-to-nathanael-smith/
Monday, 14 July 2008 at 11:41 am
[...] epistemic approach as presuppositional and labels his own as evidentialist. You will find his post here. Below I offer a rejoinder in response to his second [...]