Biblical Authority and the Peter Enns Controversy
I have again returned to reading about the suspension of Westminster Theological Seminary professor Peter Enns. The suspension, for those ignorant of the situation, is a result of his book Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament (amazon link) in which Enns advocates his so-called incarnational view of biblical authority. This view has been criticized because those who hold the view are willing to update their theological understanding of biblical inspiration and authorship in light of historical and textual data.
As I have read responses to this situation I have been paying close attention to the ways that Enns’s opponents attack his view, especially their theological grounding. One such response is written by the dean of Reformed Baptist Seminary, Dr. Robert Gonzales Jr. and is posted here. I would like to take issue with Dr. Gonzales’s post, especially this portion which he excerpts from his course notes:
Let’s suppose that the Bible is proved to be in error in some of its teachings that can be verified empirically, such as scientific or historical facts. We could no longer believe those doctrines just because the Bible teaches them. And if we can no longer believe those teachings of the Bible that can be “checked out,” how can we affirm those teachings that cannot be “checked out”? In other words, once we reject the inerrancy of the Bible, we may still choose to believe in the incarnation, the atonement, and the resurrection. But we no longer believe these doctrines because the Bible teaches them. We ultimately believe them because we choose to do so. Our own personal preference, therefore, becomes the ultimate basis for our faith.
I think that Dr. Gonzales has fallen prey to a vicious epistemic circularity. I assume he would argue that the reason that the Bible is authoritative is its divine authorship. But what reasons do we have to believe that the Bible is authored by God? Is it because the Bible makes this claim (2 Timothy 3:16)? If a stranger walked up to me and informed me that she was the president of the USA, I would have to have some evidential basis for her claim before she could be reasonably believed. Perhaps there is a reliable witness who can attest to this woman’s claim, or perhaps she can produce some document or token unique to the presidential office, but without this corroboration we have no basis for believing her. The problem Dr. Gonzales runs into is that if the Bible could be disproved on some external, rational grounds then “we could no longer believe those doctrines just because the Bible teaches them.” Hopefully, we never believed those doctrines ‘just’ because the Bible teaches them.
Now that criticism might be a bit unfair considering his paragraph was an excerpt from a larger piece. I am sure Dr. Gonzales probably grounds his belief in the reliability of the Scripture in some historical research, likely combined with the testimony of those he would judge to be reliable witnesses and even perhaps including his own religious experience. However, this is not the only issue here. I am speaking now of the latter portion of his paragraph:
…if we can no longer believe those teachings of the Bible that can be “checked out,” how can we affirm those teachings that cannot be “checked out”? In other words, once we reject the inerrancy of the Bible, we may still choose to believe in the incarnation, the atonement, and the resurrection. But we no longer believe these doctrines because the Bible teaches them. We ultimately believe them because we choose to do so. Our own personal preference, therefore, becomes the ultimate basis for our faith.
Gonzales’s perspective of the scriptures here seems to me to be quite flat. First of all, the biblical data which is verifiable can be more or less central to the Christian thesis, as well as more or less applicable for the purpose of the text. In the first case, if a passage from one of the Pauline epistles where Paul is greeting the believers in the recipient city is disproved through historical evidence, say by some manuscript that proves that the people Paul was greeting did not in fact live in the recipient city, this would not be adequate grounds for launching an attack on the whole scriptural corpus. Now if there was some verifiable proof, say, that Jesus did not exist and thus did not die or rise from the dead, then we would have adequate grounds for contradicting the Christian thesis.
In the second case, where a datum might be more or less applicable for the purpose of the passage, I am mainly referring to the genre of a given passage. For instance, one cannot expect the content of poetry to match historical data. The poet never intended the passage to be historically descriptive and thus any historical allusions need not be technically accurate. I think this is where Gonzales and I might take issue. In my view, there is no reason why the Bible cannot be littered with errors so long as those errors do not infringe upon the central content of the text. (I know that the phrase ‘central content of the text’ is almost inexcusably vague, but for now I will leave it thus. Perhaps a future post will address this issue.) I think that this view would be problematic for someone who is desiring to hold onto the doctrine of inerrancy, but I find this term unhelpful and misleading. The point of any doctrine of scripture is that the scripture is a reliable witness to the events and content of the faith.
Lastly, at the close of the paragraph Gonzales makes the implication that if our beliefs are not founded upon the biblical text, that we are simply choosing to believe something. However I think it is clear by now that there is no reason to think that the Bible is the sole evidential source for doctrinal beliefs.
Thus, I think I am siding with Enns on this one, at least insofar as Enns is on the other side of the debate as Dr. Gonzales.
For more on the controversy at WTS and Peter Enns, as well as a delightful selection of excellent articles via links, check out this website.
Sunday, 8 June 2008 at 7:54 am
Nathanael,
Thanks for your interest in my article. I have two questions for you: First, what is your ultimate criterion or presupposition for assessing the validity of any truth claims? Secondly, what is your ultimate criterion for assessing the validity of your ultimate criterion?
Bob G.
Monday, 9 June 2008 at 1:38 am
It seems that Gonzales operates with too narrow a notion of truth. He articulates one manner in which we can say that something is true. But not all that is true is susceptible to such a deductive approach. Indeed, inductive arguments need not rely on an “ultimate criterion.” Moreover, linguistic philosophers (e.g., Reid) have demonstrated other means of defining truth without the need for an ultimate starting point.
Deductive approaches, as articulated by Gonzales, prevail in anabaptist circles (and in fundamentalist circles, in general). In contrast, our Reformed confessions have generally rejected such deductive notions of Scriptural truth in favor of inductive approaches. This, at least in part, distinguishes the Reformed interpretation of Chalcedon from the Lutheran interpretation.
In recent years, many in the PCA have embraced notions of epistemology whose lineage is more in line with American fundamentalists than with Calvin and Turretin. Sadly, Pete Enns has been suspended for being too true to the historic Reformed faith (and not true enough to the fundamentalism that seems to have gained a footing in some Reformed communions).
Monday, 9 June 2008 at 3:55 pm
Dean Gonzales,
First of all, thank you very much for taking the time to respond. I am sure your schedule is busy and thus does not warrant your response, however I am grateful for your interaction.
I am afraid my answer might not satisfy you. As a student of philosophy I would answer that my ‘ultimate criterion for assessing the validity of any truth claims’ is whether or not that truth claim matches reality. As to how I judge this to be an adequate basis for knowledge (my ultimate criterion for my ultimate criterion), I would respond by saying that this is simply the way that human beings go about assessing the truth or falsehood of any proposition. Therefore, I do not have some first premise from which the rest of my philosophy / theology flows except perhaps, to quote Wittgenstein, “the world is everything that is the case.” Aside from semantic arguments, I doubt that this is at all controversial.
If you pardon my boldness, I would love to read your own response to this question.
For convenience, I have duplicated this response on the RBS blog.
Tuesday, 10 June 2008 at 9:19 pm
Nathanael,
I confess that my field of specialization is Old Testament interpretation and theology, not philosophy. But if you’ll promise to deal gently with me, I’ll try to wade into the deep waters of your area of specialty, hoping not to get in over my head.
Your ‘ultimate criterion for assessing the validity of any truth claim’ is whether or not that truth claim matches reality. That sounds like a simple, self-evident, and safe epistemological methodology. In a certain sense, it resembles my approach to knowledge. Yet, as I’m sure you’re aware, it raises some questions, like, what is “reality”? One might respond, “Reality is ‘that which is.’” But such an answer would obviously beg the question which has been debated for millennia. Many people seem to hold different views of what constitutes “reality.” Thus, we might ask, whose “reality”? Joseph Stalin’s “reality”? Mother Teresa’s “reality”? Tom Cruise’s “reality”? An atheist’s view of “reality”? Or a Christian theist’s view of “reality”?
It seems to me that one must begin with some preconceptions of “reality,” which in turn serve as the criteria by which interpretations of reality (i.e., truth claims) may be assessed. Thus, I find it hard to believe that you “do not have some first premise from which the rest of [your] philosophy / theology flows.” I would argue that the process by which human beings go about assessing the truth is much more complex than simply assessing whether or not a claim matches reality, as if everyone operates with the same definition of reality. The fact that philosophers have and continue to debate truth claims suggests, at least to me, that they are operating with more or less differing preconceived notions of reality.
Moreover, to say that one’s method for assessing truth claims is valid on the basis that “this is simply the way human beings go about assessing the truth or falsehood of any proposition” dodges the question of epistemological justification. Wittgenstein’s axiom appears to be more of a wordplay than a meaningful justification for knowledge. Why should human beings follow the method of assessing truth and falsehood in the way you advocate? Indeed, if “falsehood” is just as much part of “reality” as “truth,” then one might justify such concepts as “true falsehoods” or “false truths.” Does “reality” demand your methodology? If so, then aren’t you beginning with a predefined interpretation of reality. And if that is the case, then aren’t you also caught up in the same “vicious epistemic circularity” which you attribute to my position?
I should apologize. You politely asked for my response to my own question, and here I go asking you more questions! Okay, I’ll try to provide what will probably be a poorly stated answer to the question. Similar to you, my ‘ultimate criterion for assessing the validity of any truth claims’ is whether or not such truth claims match reality. But I obviously can’t begin with a vacuous definition of reality. In my worldview, reality has already been “predefined,” so to speak. In other words, God has interpreted the world for me. As a creature created as the imago dei, I have the “pre-programming” necessary to interpret God’s world analogically to God’s own interpretation. Thus, I assess all truth claims on the basis of how well they conform to God’s interpretation of reality. God is absolutely omniscient, omnipotent, holy, just and true. Moreover, He has revealed himself in creation, providence, the human conscience, and via special revelation (including Scripture). Therefore, the self-revealing God of Scripture provides the justification, indeed the mandate, for such a biblically conditioned epistemological methodology.
I acknowledge that you may not find this kind of reasoning convincing. After all, as you reason above, if someone claimed to be “the president of the USA, I would have to have some evidential basis for her claim before she could be reasonably believed. Perhaps there is a reliable witness who can attest to this woman’s claim, or perhaps she can produce some document or token unique to the presidential office, but without this corroboration we have no basis for believing her.” (BTW, does your use of the feminine pronoun reflect a hope that Hilary might get elected?
) But what more reliable witness to God’s own identity can be produced than God own self-attestation? If God must provide a reliable witness to confirm his identity, then would we not have to ask the same from his witness? And on ad infinitum we go! You and I may need to produce an I.D. card, but would you impose that requirement upon God? Of course, God has revealed himself to humankind clearly and convincingly, leaving sinful men without an epistemic (or ethical) excuse for rejecting his self-authenticating revelation (Rom. 1:18-21, 32; 2:12-14). In other words, God is not silent, and we, as his images, are not deaf to our Maker’s voice. It resonates within our hearts. Once we receive his forgiveness and bow to his lordship, we must allow every aspect of our lives–even our thinking–to be governed by his word. Accordingly, I believe in a thorough Christian and biblical epistemology.
Rob (above) thinks this kind of reasoning is too deductive. Actually, I advocate an epistemological method that is both deductive and also inductive. “The Realty” defines the facts, but the facts (properly interpreted) reveal “the Reality.” Stated differently, Christian theism is the necessary precondition for all human knowledge and ethics. The Christian worldview revealed in Scripture is true because of the impossibility of the contrary (a transcendental argument).
BTW, I disagree with Rob’s assessment of a truly Reformed and Calvinistic epistemology. Calvin’s view of the sensus divinitatis together with his view of the self-authenticating quality of Scripture preclude a purely evidentialist epistemology that assumes such things as “brute facts,” epistemic neutrality, and autonomous human reason as the starting point for true knowledge. It was Calvin who taught that one cannot truly know God unless he first truly knows himself; moreover, man cannot truly know himself unless he first truly knows his Maker. How’s that for “vicious epistemological circularity”!
Well, I guess I should stop here since I’m probably getting in over my head. What I’m trying to say has been better expressed by John Frame, a former Westminster professor, pupil of Van Til, and one whose epistemological method (and view of Scripture) would differ from that of Peter Enns. See Frame’s The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Presbyterian & Reformed, 1987) for a more comprehensive articulation of a biblical epistemology. I would also read Van Til’s “My Credo,” in Jerusalem & Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (P&R, 1980), as well as his “Why I Believe in God?”
Nathanael, I hope I haven’t bored or humored you too much. I do want to thank you for your politeness and for the opportunity to interact with your blog. May God guide you into all truth (John 14:6).
Cordially,
Bob Gonzales
Tuesday, 17 June 2008 at 12:37 pm
[...] earlier thread as a separate post. For those who are interested in the entire debate, please read this post and it subsequent comments. I am here responding to Dr. Robert Gonzales Jr., dean of the Reformed [...]
Tuesday, 17 June 2008 at 12:41 pm
In order to make reading a bit easier and avoid a very long page, I have published my response in a separate blog post. See the previous comment for a link.
Wednesday, 25 June 2008 at 4:36 pm
You say, “However I think it is clear by now that there is no reason to think that the Bible is the sole evidential source for doctrinal beliefs.”
I think that you are right, if I’m understanding you correctly, but this statement is not really in disagrement with the doctrine of sola scriptura (properly understod). Sola scriptura means that the Bible is our primary (not only) authority for matters of faith and practice–it is the norma normans, the sole “norming norm” for other authorities. Actually the Bible itself affirms that nature is enough to tell us something of the doctrine of God, namely that he exists and is eternally powerful (Rom. 1).
See my thoughts on Westminster critiques of Enns here http://tabrookins.blogspot.com/2008/06/frame-right-and-enns-wrong.html.
See also my post on the use of the word inerrancy here. http://tabrookins.blogspot.com/2008/06/infallible-or-inerrant.html
Monday, 14 July 2008 at 11:40 am
[...] read his critique and my reply to his critique in the comment section at the end of his post click here. He in turn wrote an entirely new post entitled, “A Response to Dr. Gonzales,” in which [...]